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Abstract This article considers the traditional Islamic narrative in the light of the
theory of religion espoused by John Hick (1922–2012). We see how the Islamic
narrative changes on a Hickean understanding of religion, particularly in the light of
the ‘bottom-up’ approach and trans-personal conception of the religious ultimate that
it espouses. Where the two readings of Islam appear to conflict, I suggest how they
can be reconciled. I argue that if Hick’s theory is incompatible with Islamic belief,
then this incompatibility does not manifest itself at the level of belief in the narrative.
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Introduction
The general phenomenon of religion has given rise to a number of second order
theories that have tried to explain it. But from Durkheim to Dennett, these theories
have not sought to be sympathetic to religion but, rather, to construe religion in non-
religious terms. Émile Durkheim’s (1858–1917) seminal reflections on religion left
him fundamentally connecting religion with a ‘moral community’ (1915) and for
Daniel Dennett (2006) religion is best understood in terms of memes.
John Hick’s (2004) contribution to the study of religion has been to propose a
theory of religion that is at once sympathetic to the phenomenon of religion yet not
committed to any particular instantiation of this phenomenon. As a philosopher, Hick
managed to catch the attention of philosophers of religion with his theory (and, of
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course, with the philosophical arguments therein) even if non-philosophers have
largely ignored him (see Kunin and Miles-Watson 2006; Pals 2006; Stausberg 2009).
Given that Hick focused (although not exclusively) on applying his theory to the
religion with which he was most familiar, namely Christianity, and given the com-
parative lack of attention to non-Christian religions in English-language philosophy
of religion, in this article I focus on applying Hick’s theory of religion to Islam. Due
to the complexity of this task, I can but offer an idea of how Hick’s theory of religion
will affect the general understanding a Muslim has of Islam.1 I will not be offering a
thorough revision of Islamic theology, or of Quranic exegesis, or of Islamic law (and
so forth). I instead intend to focus on how the Islamic religion has been traditionally
understood by Muslims by presenting an account of Islam that covers some basic
historical and doctrinal matters associated with the Islamic tradition. After presenting
this picture, I will assess how it would change in the light of a Hickean understanding,
specifically, in the light of two connected features of Hick’s theory of religion: (1) the
‘bottom-up’ approach to religion and (2) belief in a trans-personal religious ultimate
(that is, a religious ultimate that is beyond the concept of ‘person’).
By the ‘traditional’ Islamic narrative, I refer to the predominant narrative of the
Islamic tradition through the ages, a teaching that gives rise to a ‘traditional’ or
‘typical’ Muslim self-understanding. As with any religious tradition, the Islamic
religious tradition contains a variety of schools of thought, with each school
containing differences that are regarded as significant from within. My use of the
word ‘traditional’ is not intended to identify one form of Islam as opposed to another.
My use of the word ‘traditional’ is instead intended to help identify (in lieu of a
canonical creed such as the Nicene Creed of Christianity)2 the teaching that the
majority of Muslims will both recognise and attest to.
The order of discussion in this article is to run as follows. First, I present a brief
account of Hick’s theory of religion and respond to a common objection to it,
specifically, that it undermines religious confession. Second, I present an account
of Islam that I believe will resonate with Muslims the world over. Third, I suggest
how this narrative would change on a Hickean understanding and how some Muslim
sensibilities might be accommodated.
Hick’s Theory of Religion
Hick’s theory of religion was developed over the course of some 20 years until its
presentation in An Interpretation of Religion (1989). Hick continued to expound his
theory after publication of this work, both through addressing the topic of religious
diversity and through responding to numerous objections. Indeed, Hick’s theory of
religion raised so much discussion in Christian theology and the philosophy of
religion that An Interpretation of Religion was reissued in 2004 with an additional
1 We might casually refer to the understanding Muslims have of Islam as the Islamic ‘self-understanding’,
although I prefer not to personify Islam in this way by attributing understanding to it. I will, however, refer
to the understanding Muslims have of Islam as the traditional Islamic narrative.
2 For classical (although non-canonical) statements of the Sunni and Shia creed, see, respectively, Tahawi
2007 and Ibn Babawayh 1999.
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introduction, which included Hick’s responses to 15 types of ‘serious and responsi-
ble’ criticism (2004: xvii-xli).
According to Hick, the world’s religious traditions are based on human responses
to the religious ultimate, or the ‘Real’. The Real itself is beyond categorisation
although something can be done to describe what it is not (2004: xix-xxii, 239).
There are also metaphorical, or mythical, accounts of the Real and it is these accounts
that form the narrative of each religious tradition (2004: 247–248). For Hick, Jews
understand the Real as Yahweh; Christians understand the Real as God the Father;
Muslims understand the Real as Allah; and a whole host of other religious traditions
understand the Real in their own characteristic ways. These different understandings
are understandings of manifestations of the Real rather than of the Real as it is in
itself. The different understandings of the Real are all false if taken literally but all
true if taken metaphorically.
Hick’s theory of religion, as encapsulated in the previous paragraph, arises from an
attempt to consistently maintain that (1) there is a mind-independent reality (2004:
174–175) and (2) the universe is religiously ambiguous such that it is possible to
rationally interpret it in both religious and non-religious ways. According to Hick
(2004: 122–124, 154, 156–157), the religious ambiguity of the universe can be seen
in the inconclusiveness of arguments for and against the existence of God. Religious
ambiguity can also be seen in unusual events that lend themselves to being interpreted
either as miracles or as natural phenomena. In cases of religious ambiguity, it is not
that the relevant data fail to support any interpretation of it but rather the relevant data
fail to fully determine any particular interpretation of it.
If (1) is rejected then, so to speak, ‘anything goes’ and the idea that there are a
number of equally rational ways to interpret the universe – as expressed in (2) – does
not especially give rise to a problem. If (1) is maintained and (2) is rejected, then a
person could affirm that only one mode of interpreting the universe is rational. This
affirmation could involve a rejection of all religious interpretations of the universe as
being ungrounded in any form of mind-independent reality. Alternatively, rejecting
religious ambiguity can also involve a rejection of all non-religious interpretations of
the universe and all religious interpretations of the universe except for a person’s own
religious interpretation. To Hick this latter attitude seemed both arbitrary and arrogant
(Hick 2004: 235, 2010: 26) and so he was left with the problem of explaining how
multiple religious interpretations of the universe could all be rational.3 Various
religious interpretations of the universe can all be rational, according to Hick, because
none of them should be taken to be literal descriptions of the Real as it is in itself.
Consider, for example, William Shakespeare’s (1993) metaphor that all the world is a
stage (As You Like It [ca.1600], Act 2, scene 7) and his metaphor that the world is an
oyster (The Merry Wives of Windsor [ca.1600], Act 2, scene 2). Both these metaphors
refer to the world but because we do not understand them literally we would not think
that they are incompatible with each other. Furthermore, because the world is
3 The charge that advocating a specific religious perspective is arbitrary and arrogant follows from Hick’s
contention that the universe is religiously ambiguous and that religious belief involves interpreting the
universe in a religious way. Hick has also expressed this contention by saying that the best way to support
religious belief is through appeal to religious experience. But to consider only one’s own religious
interpretation as valid is rather disingenuous to the point of being arbitrary. On the other hand, if one
denies religious ambiguity in the universe then one is being closed minded to the point of arrogance.
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complex enough to have more than one interpretation neither would we be inclined to
say that only one of Shakespeare’s metaphors is correct.
We have seen how, according to Hick, different understandings of the Real,
corresponding to different world religious traditions, can all be metaphorically true.
We have also seen how this arises out of a claim about how different interpretations of
the religiously ambiguous universe can all be rational. Clearly, Hick’s theory of
religion (expressed in the former claim) is not entailed by Hick’s epistemology
(expressed in the latter claim). Hick himself referred to his theory of religion as the
pluralist hypothesis – a hypothesis that tries to make sense of the variety of religious
experience without holding it to be all delusory (2004: 235). The reason I am not also
referring to Hick’s theory as the pluralist hypothesis is because I believe Hick’s
intention to contribute to the study of religion, as a general phenomenon, has not
always been recognised. As Hick (2004: xiii) says of his An Interpretation of
Religion, ‘The book is intended to contribute to a project which no one person can
hope to complete, namely the development of a field theory of religion from a
religious point of view’. Hick also says, with appeal to Eliade (1958: xi),
There are many general interpretations of religion. These have usually been
either naturalistic, treating religion as a purely human phenomenon or, if
religious, have been developed within the confines of a particular confessional
conviction which construes all other traditions in its own terms. The one type of
theory that has seldom been attempted is a religious but not confessional
interpretation of religion in its plurality of forms; and it is this that I shall be
trying to offer here. (Hick 2004: 1)
Lack of recognition for Hick’s broad theoretical aims can be seen in numerous
objections that roughly state that because Hick’s theory of religion explains religions
in terms that they do not recognise, then the theory must be untenable. As Byrne
(1982: 299) puts it, ‘The assertion that all religions worship the one thing, though
describing it differently, implies falsely that the language used to describe the object
of worship is dispensable’. Byrne could perhaps be excused for his self-confessed
‘naiveté’ in thinking that Hick’s theory of religion could be refuted ‘with reference to
simple and quick arguments’ (1995: viii) because he responded to an early version of
Hick’s theory. But the objection can also be seen in the writing of others. Upjohn
Light (2009: 468), for example, says of Hick’s theory that ‘A meta-position claiming
to represent the world religions actually contradicts them all’. Upjohn Light suggests
that Hick, through his theory, effectively says to religious believers ‘I know better
what you’re doing than you know yourself’. Legenhausen (1999: 152) also expresses
a dislike for Hick’s theory of religion: ‘The root of the failure of Hick’s pluralism is
that it makes religion into a purely human response to the divine, or the Ultimate
Reality, while Islam teaches that religion is revealed’. Legenhausen also states,
Hick’s religious pluralism is the advocacy of a forced doctrinal synthesis. It will
not allow for ultimate differences in religious belief. No matter how strenuously
the Hindu or Buddhist denies the personal nature of ultimate reality, and no
matter how fervently the Christian asserts it, Hick would claim that there is no
real conflict. Each merely expresses features of his or her own avenue to the
Ultimate. This fails to do justice to the lived differences and conflicts among the
134 A. Dastmalchian
adherents of the world’s religions. While religious pluralism is advertised as a
theology of tolerance, it turns out to be intolerant of serious religious differ-
ences. (Legenhausen 2006: para 42)
A similar sentiment is expressed by Plantinga, who comments on Hick’s theory of
religion with some incredulity:
I am to remain a Christian, to take part in Christian worship, to accept the
splendid and powerful doctrines of traditional Christianity. However, I am also
to take it that these doctrines are only mythologically true: they are literally
false, although accepting them (i.e., accepting them as true, as literally true)
puts or tends to put one into the right relation with the Real. And how can I
possibly accept them, adopt that attitude toward them, if I think they are only
mythologically true – that is, really false? (Plantinga 2000: 61)
Perhaps the above criticisms are simply unsympathetic to (as opposed to unaware
of) Hick’s project of explaining religion in non-confessional terms. However, if there
is in fact a lack of recognition for the breadth of Hick’s aims, then the above critics
might do well to call to mind the distinction between explanatory and descriptive
types of reductionism in the analysis of religion. According to Proudfoot (1985: 196–
198), a theory of religion must not describe its subject matter in terms alien to it but it
may explain its subject matter using such terms. Consequently, a theory of religion
must take seriously the self-understanding of religious believers but may explain their
belief and activity in ways that they would not even recognise. Twiss (1990: 542–
545) makes use of this point with particular reference to Netland’s (1986: 255–257)
criticism of Hick. As Twiss notes, some would consider the lack of ‘hermeneutical
adequacy’ of Hick’s theory to count decisively against it. Reçber (2005: 5), in his own
criticism of Hick, appears to concede the Proudfoot-Twiss point that Hick is not
unreasonable to go beyond the self-understandings of religious believers in the
process of constructing an explanatory theory.
This study does assume that there is some value to Hick’s project of seeking an
explanatory theory of religion. On this basis Islam will be taken as a case study and it
will be argued that the Hickean understanding of the Islamic narrative can be
reconciled with the traditional understanding. This is not to say that a Muslim would
want to necessarily wholeheartedly adopt Hick’s theory of religion. After all, as we
see in Hosseini 2010; Legenhausen 2006, 2013; Reçber 2005; Shah-Kazemi 2013,
there are a number of criticisms of Hick’s theory of religion from a Muslim perspec-
tive that are independent of anything that could be concluded from this study.
However, by reconciling the Hickean understanding of the Islamic narrative with
the traditional understanding, I at least hope to have shown that if acceptance of
Hick’s theory is incompatible with acceptance of Islamic beliefs then it is not because
of the way the traditional Islamic narrative is re-written. In other words, if a Muslim
wants to reject Hick’s theory of religion, then his arguments must be directed to
something other than the effect of the theory on the traditional Islamic narrative. This
point, I believe, helps for a better understanding of how Hick’s theory of religion
relates to Islam and, perhaps, to other religions also.
Also, as Muslims and other religious believers seek new audiences and seek to
maintain existing ones, it might be that my discussion will help show the extent to
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which the language of Hick’s theory of religion can be used to explain religious
beliefs in a new way. As Williams (a former Archbishop of Canterbury) notes in the
context of responding to revisionary claims about the origins of Christianity,
[…] all human language does adjust to historical change, even when trying to
stay the same; as Cardinal Newman [1801–1890] observed, to say the same
thing as your ancestors said, you may well need to say something apparently
very different. (Williams 2012; cf. Newman 1846: 27)
Perhaps this is the same sentiment that caused Mutahhari (1920–1979), in the
context of advocating a rejuvenation of Islamic jurisprudence, to insist that new ideas
need not necessarily be feared:
The greatest enemy of the Qur’an is inflexibility and the maintaining of an
outlook of a particular time and a particular era, just as the greatest obstacle for
understanding nature was that in the past scholars thought understanding nature
meant understanding that which was related from the likes of Aristotle and
Plato. (Mutahhari 1991: 73)
Mutahhari’s reference to nature is poignant given that Hick (2004: 377) also
referred to nineteenth-century debates surrounding the evolution of life on earth to
say that in due course his theory of religion may be seen to be less threatening to
religious belief than it is at the moment.4
So, even though Hick’s theory of religion uses rhetoric that is different from
traditional Islamic rhetoric, this study will proceed on the basis that this need
not necessarily be a reason for a Muslim to reject Hick’s theory. One Muslim
thinker who has embraced Hick’s ideas is Soroush (2009) yet Soroush conducts
his discussion in his own terms and on the basis of his engagement with a
wide range of thinkers from the Islamic and Western traditions that Hick does
not even mention. This study on the other hand consciously seeks to engage
with Hick on his own terms.5 The scope of this study also differs from Aslan’s
(1998) exposition, and comparison, of the thought of Hick and Nasr on the
plurality and diversity of religion. While some remarks are made by Aslan
(1998: 182–186) on Hick’s view of Islam as a valid world religion, these
remarks do not constitute an application of Hick’s ideas to the Islamic narra-
tive. Moreover, as Aslan shows, the analytical thought of Hick and the
perennialist thought of Nasr are so different that they do not produce a
synthesis of ideas that might be used in this study.
In the next section I will present the traditional Islamic narrative. This will
be followed by a section in which I modify the traditional narrative in accor-
dance with Hick’s theory of religion and argue that a traditional Muslim need
not reject the theory given that the two narratives can be reconciled.
4 For some idea of how religious belief can be maintained in the face of evolutionary theory, see Dawes
2007; Haught 2008; Miller 1999; Ruse 2001.
5 For an overview of Soroush’s view of religion, see Dahlén 2003; Rizvi 2012. Although Soroush (2009:
134) expresses approval of Hick’s pluralism, he clarifies, in response to a question posed to him at the end
of a 2010 lecture, that he does not approve of any attempt to demystify or naturalise religion. In his
response Soroush mentions his respect for Hick but says that, as a student of Rumi, he cannot neglect the
supernatural realm. Listen to Soroush 2010 from 1 h 48 min.
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The Traditional Islamic Narrative
Arabia, in the middle of the first millennium of the Common Era, was a foul place
and the land of ignorance. The idol-worshipping, carrion-eating, baby-sacrificing
tribes of its population were at continuous war with each other. From this intellectual
and cultural backwater arose an upright and trustworthy gentleman called
Muhammad. As Razwy says,
Arabia was a pit of iniquity and the bastion of idolatry and polytheism,
Muhammad himself was never contaminated by any vice or sin, and he never
bowed before any idol. Even before he formally declared that he came to
establish the Kingdom of Heaven on earth [i.e. Medina],6 his own conduct
and character were a reflection of [the] Qur’an – the glorious. Even his critics
have not been able to point out any divergence between his conduct and the
precepts of [the] Qur’an at any time, before or after the Proclamation. (Razwy
1997: 35)
It was not until the age of 40, in the year 610 CE, that Muhammad was visited by
the Angel Gabriel, who told him to read in the name of his Lord, the Most Noble
creator of mankind. The meeting occurred in the mountain cave of Hira outside the
Arabian trading town of Mecca, a cave that Muhammad used to frequent in order to
meditate. The meetings continued and Muhammad was informed that God had
chosen him to convey His final message to mankind. The message, which was to
be completed over the course of 23 years, detailed a new way of life with both creedal
and practical dimensions. Thus, the age of ignorance ended and the age of Islam was
born.
The message from God was conveyed faithfully by Gabriel to Muhammad and
faithfully by Muhammad to Arabia and beyond, beginning with an invitation to his
family and ending with the unification of Arabia upon the new religion. Some special
parts of the message had been designated for verbatim transcription so that they could
be collected as a book. The Quran, Arabic for ‘recital’, is this book – the literal word
of God to mankind as conveyed by his final messenger and prophet.7 The statements
of the Quran are true and to be believed on the basis that they are statements from
God, who has no needs and therefore no need to lie. The chief sign of God being the
author of the Quran is the Quran’s inimitability. How else, except through revelation,
was an unlettered man from an ignorant land to produce such a masterpiece? Sir
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) writes:
6 ‘Kingdom of Heaven on earth’ seems to be a phrase that Razwy has borrowed from the Bible to refer to
the ideal political state as presided over by Muhammad, that is, the city of Medina. ‘The State of Medina
was the physical apparatus of the first and the last Kingdom of Heaven on Earth’ (1997: 87). ‘The Kingdom
of Heaven on Earth which Muhammad Mustafa had founded, had ceased, after his death, to be “heavenly”,
and had become an ersatz Greek or Persian government’ (1997: 481).
7 In Islamic terminology, a messenger (rasul) who is human (rather than angelic) is one who receives,
through revelation, a new Scripture for propagation. Such messengers include Abraham, Moses, David,
Jesus, and Muhammad, although others have also been acknowledged. A prophet (nabi), on the other hand,
is anybody who has been appointed by God to teach and guide. The class of messengers, therefore, is
included in the class of prophets. (See Bearman et al. 2013.) The Qur’an refers to Muhammad as the ‘seal of
the prophets’ (33:40) and this is understood to mean that he was the final prophet and, therefore, the final
messenger too.
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I […] do not think it out of place to argue that a person who was born in a land
full of sand and stones, who had become an orphan at a tender age, who had
neither received training in a dār al ‘ulūm (big madrasah [religious school]) nor
heard the doctrines of Socrates, Hippocrates or Plato, nor sat at the feet of an
ustād [teacher] nor enjoyed the company of wise men, philosophers or men of
political and moral science, but who spent forty years of his life among
uneducated and rude camel drivers, who for forty years had seen nobody but
a people addicted to idolatry, internecine warfare and men and women who
prided themselves on theft and fornication. Such a man, who all at once rose
against all his own people and, albeit surrounded on four sides of idolatry, yet
professed La ilāha [illa] Allāh [There is no god but God] – who not only said it
but made all his people say it, who for centuries had worshipped Lāt and Manāt
and ‘Uzzá, who eradicated from his people all this bad behaviour and these
immoral practices; who made them throw to the ground and break their idols
and exalted the name and worship of God throughout the entire peninsula, the
peninsula which, after Abraham and Ishmael, had been sullied by a thousand
act[s] of impurity. Who then restored to it its original purity and the great
religion of Abraham? Who, I ask, after forty years put light in man’s heart, the
light which has illumined not only the Arab peninsula but the whole world?
(Troll 1978: 323–324)
The Quran not only confirmed the truth of Muhammad’s mission as being
by divine decree, but confirmed the missions of all the previous prophets,
from Adam through Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. Before Muhammad, mankind
was not sufficiently developed to receive the final perfected religion and
could only bear it in simple and incomplete form. But the religion that
Muhammad brought was complete and Muhammad is, therefore, the final
messenger of God.
Much in the Islamic religion is familiar to Jews and Christians in particular. Talk of
an almighty God, revelation, prophets, judgement, heaven, hell, angels, and devils is
a part of the vocabulary of the three religions. But the Islamic tradition sees itself as
the recipient of an uncorrupted religion of pure and unadulterated monotheism:
The Jews call Uzair a son of God and the Christians call Christ the son of God.
That is a saying from their mouths; they but imitate what the unbelievers of old
used to say. God fights against them: how they are deluded away from the truth!
They take their priests and their anchorites to be their lords instead of God and
(also) Christ the son of Mary; yet they were commanded to worship but one
God: there is no god but He. Glory to Him from the partners they associate
(with Him). (Quran, 9:30–31)
Islam, very much like Judaism but not very much like Christianity, contains a law
dealing with both social interactions and private matters of worship that is to be
followed in obedience to God and for the material and spiritual benefit of ourselves in
this life, as well as for the benefit to ourselves in the afterlife. The law is derived from
the Quran and tradition (Sunnah) of Muhammad, which together can be called
‘scripture’. For Sunni Muslims, the companions of Muhammad and the two gener-
ations of Muslims after them are also sources of authority. For Shia Muslims this is
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not the case; instead select members of Muhammad’s family and descendents are
authoritative.
Muslims throughout the Muslim nation (ummah) will, I believe, recognise and
attest to the foregoing account of the Islamic narrative.8 However, what would the
traditional Islamic narrative look like according to Hick’s theory of religion? In the
next section I seek to answer this question by suggesting how key parts of the Islamic
narrative would be written in Hickean terms. I aim to show that accepting Hick’s
theory of religion does not mean changing the narrative beyond recognition or in
ways that a traditional Muslim could never accept.
Modifications to the Traditional Islamic Narrative
Borrowing from Hick (2005: 7), we can say that Muslims tend to think of Islam in a
‘top-down’ way. The top-down perspective can be seen to be operating in the
traditional Islamic narrative in the idea that God reveals himself to Muhammad such
that Muhammad is a passive recipient of the revealed message. This top-down
perspective is reinforced by the Quran with its use of the word tanzil when referring
to revelation, a word that connotes sending down, and not just wahy, a word that does
not carry the connotation of sending down.9
In contrast to the top-down approach to religion, Hick’s theory of religion is
developed from (and hence requires) a ‘bottom-up’ approach. This approach is
encapsulated in the sub-title of Hick’s major work on religious diversity, An
Interpretation of Religion (2004 [1989]). The subtitle of this work is Human
Responses to the Transcendent. Hick believes that religions – contrary to the under-
standing their adherents might have – are the result of individual and community
responses to the transcendent and ultimate reality, that is, the Real (2004: 1, 10–11,
153–158). As Hick (2005: 7) puts it, the bottom-up approach to religion starts with
the observable realities of human life and asks what they imply. We might understand
the bottom-up approach as an approach that is more receptive of explanatory natu-
ralism than the top-down approach. In other words, in the bottom-up approach
supernatural entities and processes are not immediately invoked in order to explain
religious phenomena.10
Approaching Islam ‘from-the-bottom-up’ changes the narrative of the previous
section. The history regarding the condition of pre-Islamic Arabia and of
Muhammad’s impeccable conduct need not be revised when rewriting the Islamic
narrative. Neither do the historical beliefs regarding dates and places need to change.
What changes is the account of how Muhammad came into contact with God or, in
Hickean terms, the Real.
A Hickean version of the Islamic narrative might start by noting Muhammad’s
strong sense of morality and the distress he would have felt from witnessing the moral
corruption of his society. This, together with his contemplative habit and the
8 For other short accounts of the Islamic narrative, see Akhtar 1990: 3–6, 2008: 18–35; Shepard 2009: 6–9.
9 The n-z-l root occurs 293 times in the Quran, in 12 derived forms, including 15 times as tanzil; the w-h-y
root occurs 78 times in the Quran, in 2 derived forms, including 6 times as wahy (Dukes 2011). Madigan
2013 discusses both the concept of tanzil and the concept of wahy.
10 For an examination of religious and naturalist explanations, see Dawes 2009.
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proximity he would have to the natural world in those days, led to the most profound
mystical experiences imaginable. These mystical experiences compelled Muhammad
to reform Arabia in line with universal moral principles, as can be seen in the appeal
of an early Muslim, Jafar ibn Abi Talib, to the Negus of Abyssinia.
O King, we were an uncivilized people, worshipping idols, eating corpses,
committing abominations, breaking natural ties, treating guests badly, and our
strong devoured our weak. Thus we were until God sent us an apostle whose
lineage, truth, trustworthiness, and clemency we know. He summoned us to
acknowledge God’s unity and to worship him and to renounce the stones and
images which we and our fathers formerly worshipped. He commanded us to
speak the truth, be faithful to our engagements, mindful of the ties of kinship
and of kindly hospitality, and to refrain from crimes and bloodshed. He forbade
us from committing abominations and from speaking lies, and from devouring
the property of orphans, and from vilifying just women. He commanded us to
worship God alone and to not associate anything with Him, and he gave us
orders about prayer, almsgiving, and fasting […]. (Guillaume 1955: 151–152,
with grammatical mistakes edited)
The bottom-up approach to Islam, as required by Hick’s theory of religion,
allows us to understand the context in which Muhammad’s mystical experiences
occurred. This contextualisation in turn allows us to understand why Islam is
called the religion of human nature (din al-fitrah) (see Quran 30:30; Mohamed
1996). It is, perhaps, because Muhammad’s experiences were a reaction to the
inhumane moral corruption of his day that the concept of an uncorrupted
human nature is so important to Islam.
On a Hickean understanding, Muhammad’s experiences were made possible by his
openness to the Real and the moral corruption of his society was made possible by the
opposite inclination. In alternative Hickean terms, we can say Muhammad was
reality-centred whereas the majority of his society was self-centred. It would not be
incorrect to say, with the proponents of the top-down approach, that God caused
Muhammad’s experiences; it is just that the bottom-up approach to religion, Hick
would argue, seems to give us a clearer picture of the experiences that prompted
Muhammad to establish a new religion.
So, on a Hickean account, Muhammad understood his contact with the Real – not
incorrectly – in terms of revelation from God delivered by the Angel Gabriel.
According to Hick (2010: 119) ‘when a human being is exceptionally open to the
divine presence, he or she has a vivid awareness of God, which is then called
revelation’. Muhammad’s understanding of his contact with the Real follows from
his awareness of Judaism and Christianity and perhaps from the general religious
milieu of fifth-century Arabia.11 But Hick’s theory of religion does not restrict
revelation, that is, openness to the Real. On a Hickean account it is in principle
possible for anybody to be open to the Real and therefore for anybody to experience
receiving revelation. It is difficult, therefore, to give a Hickean basis to the claim that
Muhammad was the final messenger and prophet of God. If no such basis can be
11 The exact cultural and religious environment of the Arabia of Muhammad’s day has been the subject of
some discussion. Cf. Crone 1987; Hoyland 2001; Peters 1994; Serjeant 1990.
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found then it would seem that the traditional Islamic narrative and the Hickean
version of it really do conflict.
But just because potentially anybody can be open to the Real and to therefore
construing her or his experience in terms of receiving revelation, it does not mean that
anybody after Muhammad has (or will). While Hick’s theory of religion does not
corroborate Muhammad’s claim that he was the final messenger and prophet of God,
it does not deny the claim. Muslims are therefore free to maintain this part of the
traditional narrative. It could be, for example, that Muhammad predicted (rather than
prophesised) the final nature of his mission from witnessing the decline of humanity.
After all, who nowadays could claim to be so uncorrupted from birth by modern
society and the built environment that he could have such profound mission-inducing
responses to the Real? Perhaps Muhammad could tell that his experiences were rare
enough for his day let alone for the times that were to come after him.
The bottom-up approach gives an understanding of Islam in terms of Muhammad’s
response to his place-time. It would therefore seem right, in line with this approach, that
were a defence of Islamic beliefs and practices to be constructed, emphasis would be
placed on arguing that Muhammad had an astounding character that allowed his
response to the Real and that therefore made his teaching worth following.
Furthermore, emphasis would be placed on the advantage of adopting Muhammad’s
teaching. This apologetic strategy can be contrasted with the strategy adopted by the top-
down approach to Islam, which places emphasis on proving the existence of God, His
intentions for mankind, and that the Quran is the exact record of a genuine revelation
from God. This is not to say that the top-down approach to Islam does not argue that
Muhammad had an impeccable character or that his teaching is beneficial. It is rather the
case that adopting a bottom-up approach to Islam requires a shift of emphasis, which
affects the way Islam is presented and defended.
Hick claims that his theory of religion is not alien to the religious traditions and he
recounts some of the evidences for this view. With regard to Islam, Hick (2004: 50,
233, 274) appeals to the great Sufi poet, Jalal al-Din Rumi (1207–1273), and to the
Andalusian mystic, Ibn Arabi (1165–1240). These figures teach of a more complex
understanding of Islam that goes beyond the basic picture outlined in the previous
section. Important in their teachings is a trans-personal conception of God
(DeLamotte 1980: 13; Izutsu 1983: 23; Khosla 1987: 21–25; Rizvi 2008: 368–
369).12 Such a conception of God, also popular among Muslim theologians
(Legenhausen 1986), leads naturally to a bottom-up approach to Islam, which is the
approach required for adoption of Hick’s theory of religion. This is because if God is
not literally thought of as a person, albeit of infinite perfection, it will not be thought
that He communicated with Muhammad as human people communicate with each
other (albeit via an angel) whereby ideas are conveyed by means of language. A
trans-personal conception of God calls out for a bottom-up approach to Islam for if
God did not literally intend for Muhammad to convey a message, the Islamic
12 ‘Trans-personal’ is not a commonly used term and it may seem more appropriate to ascribe belief in an
impersonal God to Ibn Arabi, Rumi, and Muslim theologians in general. However, in the light of Hick’s
(2004: xx-xxii, 252–296) discussions, this term no longer seems to suggest the opposite of ‘personal’. I am
confident that Ibn Arabi, Rumi, and Muslim theologians in general, would not want to suggest that either
‘personal’ or ‘impersonal’ fully captures what it is to be God.
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narrative (allegory withstanding) must be understood in a different way, which means
a bottom-up rather than a top-down way.
Explaining Islamic beliefs and practices in Hickean terms is sure to face
challenges. A challenge of the bottom-up approach to Islam would be to
explain why scripture should not always be taken at face value, why we should
understand anything in non-scriptural terms, and why the traditional narrative is
open to being told in a different way. Another issue would be explaining why
the personal attributes of God mentioned in scripture should not be understood
to mean that God is personal. This would in turn involve giving a new account
of such things as petitionary prayer, which would have to mean something
different to a petition of an all-hearing and all-powerful being to bring about a
desired state of affairs. Yet a further issue would be to explain why the spirit of
the Islamic law should be followed and not primarily its letter. So, for example,
skin-to-skin contact in the form of a handshake between unrelated members of
the opposite sex might be overlooked as a harmless greeting; and changing the
congregational day for Muslims in the West from Friday to Sunday would not
be seen as sacrilegious.
Existing discussions in the Islamic tradition, that is, from contexts not relating to
Hick’s theory of religion, will no doubt help inform responses to the challenges
mentioned in the previous paragraph. My aim in this study has been to focus only
upon the traditional Islamic narrative and to view how it changes in the light of a
Hickean understanding of religion. I will therefore not be pursuing the specific issues
raised in the previous paragraph any further despite their importance.
Conclusion
In this study I have been mindful to consider Hick’s theory of religion in the light of
its broad explanatory aims. I have been unpersuaded, therefore, by claims that Hick is
unfaithful to the understandings religious believers have of their own religions. On
this basis I have examined the traditional Islamic narrative, or what might be termed
the typical Muslim self-understanding. The aim of this examination was to ascertain
whether Hick’s theory of religion does indeed display an incompatibility with Islamic
belief. My assessment is that if the theory is incompatible with Islamic belief, then
this incompatibility does not manifest itself at the level of belief in the narrative. The
significance of this conclusion stems from it being widely held that Hick’s theory of
religion is in obvious error for seeking to explain the variety of religion in terms alien
to the religions.
Although I have argued that the Hickean rendering of the Islamic narrative can be
reconciled with the traditional narrative I do not mean to suggest by this that the
traditional narrative should be henceforth discarded. Neither do I claim that a Muslim
will not have other reasons (apart from incompatibility with self-understanding) to
reject Hick’s theory of religion. I do suggest, however, that a non-reactionary view of
Hick’s theory of religion will be able to identify the advantages and disadvantages of
the theory. One advantage could be the naturalist presumption of Hick’s theory, as
expressed in the bottom-up approach to religion, which will allow religious believers
to more effectively communicate with non-believers. In any case, I hope that my
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discussion will lead to a deeper understanding of Hick’s theory of religion and that
which unites the religions of the world.13
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